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THE ABSENT FOUNDATION:  




Nihil est sine ratione, “nothing is without reason.” For everything that is, there 
is an answer to the question why it is just so and not otherwise—and, 
ultimately, there is a reason (ratio) grounding the fact that there is something 
rather than nothing. Reality as a whole is thus “rational” or “reasonable,” in the 
sense that everything is based on something and has a “why” or a “how come” 
that grounds it, rendering it comprehensible and meaningful and thus letting it 
be part of meaningful reality. Nothing is without something that lets it be what 
it is. This is the famous “principle of reason” (principium rationis)—in a slightly 
different formulation, the “principle of the restoration of sufficient reason” 
(principium reddendae rationis sufficientis)—which was first explicitly 
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formulated in these words by G. W. Leibniz, although not as a doctrine of his 
own but as a fundamental and generally accepted philosophical principle. 
 
There is in Nature a reason [ratio] why something should exist rather 
than nothing. This is a consequence of the great principle that 
nothing comes to be without reason, just as there also must be a 
reason why this exists, rather than something else.1 
 
Indeed, in one form or another, the principle of reason has been an 
integral part of Occidental metaphysics ever since antiquity. The central issue 
of Aristotle’s Metaphysics—the question which Heidegger names the leading 
question (Leitfrage) of Occidental metaphysics as a whole—concerns that-
which-is, beings.2 What is a being as such? What is a being insofar as it is a 
being? Or, as Aristotle reformulates the question, what is the being-ness 
(ousia), the fundamental being-character, of beings as such? For Aristotle, the 
first essential characteristic of being-ness is fundamentality, foundationality.3 
What truly is must be a hypokeimenon (in Latin substantia, “substance,” or 
subiectum, “subject”)—literally, something that “lies beneath” as an ontological 
basis or foundation, letting other, dependent beings be while itself remaining 
ontologically independent. The most being of all beings is that on which all 
other beings are dependent but which is itself absolutely independent of 
anything beyond itself. 
The ontological investigation of Books Zeta, Eta, and Theta of Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics thus finds its culmination in the theology of Book Lambda—a 
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discussion of God as the absolute, the most fundamental and necessary being-
ness and principle. The Aristotelian notion of God as absolute self-awareness, 
as perfect being in-itself and for-itself, was then taken over by medieval 
Scholasticism—for St. Thomas, God as the uncreated creator and the ultimate 
cause of things is not only the most being of beings (maxime ens) but 
subsistence and permanence, that is, being-ness, as such (ipsum esse 
subsistens).4 Heidegger’s famous genealogy of modernity shows how, since 
Descartes, the self-conscious I, now interpreted with regard to the absolute and 
immediate self-certainty of the cogito, gradually replaces God as the 
fundamental subject of reality. As modern metaphysics unfolds, human 
subjectivity as the basis of meaningfulness becomes more and more absolute 
and self-sufficient; this “subjectivization” culminates in Nietzsche’s idea of the 
“superhuman” subject who no longer simply apprehends given objectivity but 
instead gives itself its own “truths” as fuel for its essence, that is, the ceaseless 
will to self-enhancement.5  
In asking its leading question concerning the being-ness of beings, the 
metaphysical tradition has, according to Heidegger, constantly sought a 
supreme, ideal form of being-ness which all beings could be referred back to 
and founded upon. Yet from Plato to Nietzsche, metaphysics has been unable 
to radically pose what Heidegger calls the “basic question” or “fundamental 
question” (Grundfrage) of philosophy;6 it has never really inquired into the 
origin of its own “rationality.” What are the experience of ideal being-ness as 
something foundational and the subsequent metaphysical demand for 
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foundations in themselves based on? What is the foundation, ground, or 
reason of being-ness, of the presence of beings as such? How come there is 
being-ness in the first place?  
We know that the achievement of Leibniz was to intimate this question by 
asking why there should be something rather than nothing.7 However, he also 
immediately provides this question with a metaphysical answer: the ultimate 
reason for the fact that there is being-ness at all is the perfection of God as the 
most being of all beings. Yet it must be emphasized that overlooking the radical 
dimensions of this question was neither a personal failure of Leibniz nor an 
“error” of the metaphysical tradition he stood in. Heidegger emphasizes that the 
basic question is only really becoming plausible as a question now, in the 
(post)modern epoch, after the project of founding beings on ideal being-ness 
has been pursued to its extreme point of culmination, completion, and 
saturation by Hegel and Nietzsche.8 
In what follows, I will briefly study Heidegger’s attempt to pose the basic 
question by way of reinterpreting and radicalizing Leibniz’s principle.9 He does 
this notably in the 1928 lecture course Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, in 
the 1929 essay “On the Essence of Reason,” and in the 1955–56 lectures on 
The Principle of Reason. Finally, following Jean-François Mattéi, I will try to 
suggest a sense in which the later Heidegger’s “fourfold” (Geviert) is an attempt 
to reformulate the traditional Aristotelian articulation of the essence of 
foundation or reason. I will argue that an insight into Heidegger’s 
reinterpretation offers an essential path to an understanding of his endeavor to 
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reconsider the ground—or rather, the back-ground—of the leading theme of the 
metaphysical tradition, of the being-ness of beings as such.  
How do we primarily understand Leibniz’s simple thesis—that nothing is 
without being based on something? For the modern scientific mind, “reason” or 
“ground” is first and foremost associated with cause and causality.10 Modern 
science would tend to interpret the principle of reason to say that for every 
phenomenon, there is something that causes it to be the way it is; there is 
nothing random or spontaneous in nature. The initial approach of the modern 
scientist to any phenomenon is thus to attempt to explain it causally through 
an account of the factors that cause it to be the way it is, in accordance with 
certain causal laws. Such laws, which are basically formulated through 
induction from observations, tell us what is causally brought forth by what, 
thus permitting us to predict certain observations, to produce them 
experimentally and, eventually, to control them. As Heidegger points out in 
“The Question Concerning Technology,” modern science does not only make 
technological applications possible, it is essentially technical in itself.11 The 
conceptual origin of technology lies in the Greek technē,12 defined by Aristotle 
as familiarity with a principle that allows the bringing-about (poiēsis) of certain 
results13—a “know-how”—and distinguished14 from epistēmē, true science in 
the sense of a disinterested, comprehensive grasp of the structures of a certain 
phenomenal field. Science is “theoretical” in the sense that it finds its 
fulfillment in the activity of theōrein, “theory” or “speculation”—that is, in the 
comprehensive overview of reality in its fullness, without productive aims.15  
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In modernity, especially after the fall of German Idealism and its peculiar 
concept of science (Wissenschaft), “theory” and “science” have gradually come 
to mean the opposite of what they meant for Aristotle. It now belongs to the 
essence of scientific theories to have predictive power, and their role is thus 
essentially instrumental; scientific explanation of phenomena now entails the 
technical ability to produce certain results experimentally. Furthermore, 
whereas for Aristotle philosophical meditation concerning the principles 
(archai) of reality as a whole was precisely the most profound, most universal, 
and supreme scientific activity, in the modern age, scientific “research” and 
philosophical “speculation” have become two fundamentally different 
approaches. For the positivist and naturalist trends of thought, positive 
science, based on regularities in empirical observations, is our most profound 
way of getting to know what reality is like.  
Kant, however, retains for philosophy another task as “transcendental” 
philosophy: philosophy seeks the necessary a priori basis and foundation of 
science, the condition of meaningful observations in the first place. 
  
I call all cognition transcendental that is occupied not so much with 
objects but rather with our manner of cognizing objects in general, 
insofar as this is to be possible a priori. A system of such concepts 
would be called transcendental philosophy.16 
 
Kant, too, is looking for the grounds of phenomena. However, his 
transcendental approach does not seek the causal grounds of objects in other 
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objects; instead, following the metaphysical tradition, it seeks to ground objects 
in the necessary a priori structure of objectivity as such.17 Instead of reducing 
beings or facts to other chronologically anterior beings or facts, transcendental 
philosophy considers beings in relation to their very being-ness. Heidegger 
stresses that Kant’s use of the term “transcendental,” which in medieval 
philosophy denotes the most general categories of being-ness, is not arbitrary. 
In order to clarify the a priori structures of experience, it is necessary to 
transcend, to “overstep” (übersteigen) the immediately present, already 
constituted experience towards the structures of its constitution.18 However, 
these transcendental structures are not transcendent to our experience, in the 
sense of being beyond its reach. Rather, they form the structural background 
or horizon that necessarily accompanies and structures our experience of the 
object occupying the foreground or focal point of our experience. 
As Heidegger emphasizes, Kant’s basic framework is that of Cartesian 
metaphysics, and he accordingly seeks the reality of things in their 
objectivity—that is, in their capacity to be represented by the cognizing 
subject—and therefore poses his transcendental question in terms of the 
preconditions of subjective representation (Vorstellung).19 However, this should 
not prevent us from appreciating Kant’s Greek background. It is precisely 
Kant’s transcendental search for the fundamental structural principles of 
meaningfulness that, according to Heidegger, makes him Greek in spirit.20 In 
the opening words of Aristotle’s Physics—words that Heidegger praises as being 
worth more than entire libraries of philosophical literature21—we find the aim 
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of philosophy already defined as a transcending, an overstepping of the 
immediate and already constituted everyday reality toward its fundamental, 
transcendental principles (archai): 
 
In all paths of research [methodos] to which principles [archai], 
grounds [aitia] and fundamental elements [stoicheia] belong, insight 
and scientific understanding result from acquaintance with these, for 
we take ourselves to be acquainted with something as soon as we are 
acquainted with its primary grounds and primary principles and have 
proceeded all the way to its elements. . . . Our path is originally such 
that it proceeds from what is more recognizable and more evident for 
us to what is more evident and recognizable originally [physei]; for 
what is recognizable to us is not identical with what is recognizable as 
such.22 
 
What is more easily recognized by us—the immediately present and fully 
constituted reality—is not identical with what is more primary in the order of 
the origination and emergence (physis) of reality—that is, the structural 
principles of its constitution, which are always implicitly there as the necessary 
background of all beings. The “method”—literally, the “path” (hodos)—of 
philosophical investigation is to proceed from the immediately given and to 
transcend it towards its necessary structural background. Already for Aristotle, 
philosophy is essentially “transcendental” in the broadest possible sense.23  
In the Physics, Aristotle presents his famous analysis of the four basic 
kinds of ground or reason (aition).24 These are: (1) “that out of which” (ex hou) 
the thing consists, its material or “stuff” (hylē), such as gold; (2) its form, 
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generic appearance or essence (eidos), such as that of a bowl; (3) the mover or 
originator (ho kinēsas) of its becoming what it properly is, such as the 
goldsmith; and 4) the final end or purpose (telos) of the thing, that for the sake 
of which (hou heneka) it is real, the “good” proper to the thing in question. 
These four are usually known by their Scholastic names as the material, the 
formal, the efficient, and the final cause. However, Heidegger maintains that 
there is no “causality” in the modern sense of cause and effect involved here. 
The very notion of “efficient cause” (causa efficiens) is Roman in origin and 
remains foreign to Greek thought.25 Instead, the four reasons are to be 
understood as the fourfold context on the basis of which the grounded thing 
becomes meaningfully present.26 The aitia are the four fundamental factors 
that are responsible for the coming-to-be of beings and for their emergence into 
presence. They form the background “through which” (dia ti) the presence of 
the grounded thing is possible, to which it owes its presence and therefore 
always refers back to—the fourfold answer to the question “why this (and not 
something else)?”27 What the Aristotelian description of the four reasons 
ultimately and half-unwittingly refers back to—in a Heideggerian reading that 
overcomes Aristotle’s own tendency to objectify these reasons—is “world” (Welt) 
as the context of mutual references that transcendentally surrounds every 
being and at the same time constitutes the horizon which makes this being 
meaningful in the first place, that is, lets it be.28   
Heidegger is, in fact, arguing that ever since its Greek beginning, Western 
philosophy has been “transcendental” in the sense that it has sought the 
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structural grounds that lie implicit within and beyond explicit reality.29 Even 
Husserl’s transcendental reduction can be understood as the last great attempt 
to revive this original transcendental sense of philosophical investigation as 
such.30 The phenomenological reduction is literally an attempt to re-conduct 
philosophical attention from already constituted things back to the structure 
and process of their constitution. Heidegger famously reinterprets the 
phenomenological reduction in the following manner: 
 
For Husserl, the phenomenological reduction . . . is the method of re-
conducting [Rückführung] phenomenological vision from the natural 
attitude of the human being, living within the world of things and 
persons, back to the transcendental life of consciousness and its 
noetico-noematic experiences, where objects are constituted as 
correlates of consciousness. For us, the phenomenological reduction 
signifies re-conducting phenomenological vision from the so-and-so 
determined apprehension of beings back to the understanding of the 
Being . . . of these beings.31 
 
This is precisely how Heidegger reinterprets the question concerning the 
ground of beings and transcendental philosophy as the quest for these 
grounds. This was shown to be a questioning of the structural background, 
horizon, and context which surrounds and grounds beings and is necessarily 
implied in their presence. For Aristotle, this background is constituted by the 
principles (archai) of reality itself, the most fundamental principle being God. 
For Kant and Husserl, the background of objects is the transcendental 
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structure of objectivity-for-subjectivity—self-conscious subjectivity being itself 
the fundamental foundation. In all of these cases, the fundamental background 
of beings is ideal being-ness as the sphere of absolute self-presence, be it that 
of God or of the I-subject. Heidegger now poses the fundamental question: 
What is the background of this being-ness as such?  
 For Heidegger, this necessary, implicit background of reality is, of course, 
nothing else than what he calls Being (Sein or, more consistently with the 
archaic orthography, Seyn)—Being not in the traditional sense of the being-
ness of beings or of the objectivity of objects, but instead in the radical and 
archaic post- or pre-metaphysical sense. The question of the ground of being-
ness as such is, fundamentally, the question of Being (Seinsfrage). What 
Heidegger’s post-metaphysical thinking calls into question is Being as the 
implicit background which allows the being-ness or presence of beings as the 
explicit foreground. Even though, in Being and Time, the discovery of Being is 
referred to as “transcendental truth,”32 for the later Heidegger it becomes more 
and more evident that this kind of new foundational thinking cannot properly 
be called “transcendental,” for it no longer seeks an ideal, universal being-ness 
that would “transcend” individual beings in the sense of being “superior” to 
them in a metaphysically determined ontological hierarchy.33 Nor is it, strictly 
speaking, “foundational” thinking, for the ground of being-ness cannot be a 
foundation in the traditional sense of a point of reference that is more real than 
immediate reality itself. What is sought in this other questioning of grounds is 
a ground that is other to and different from being-ness, presence or reality—
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and, in that sense, un-being, un-present, un-real—and lets being-ness occupy 
the foreground precisely in differing from it as its other. 
Being in this other, different sense is precisely the nothing (Nichts), no-
thing-ness as such.34 This no-thing-ness should not be thought of as some 
self-contained “entity”, separate from some-thing-ness. Instead, Being as the 
nothing “is” precisely the “ontological difference” itself—not as the metaphysical 
distinction between beings and their being-ness, but in the radical sense as the 
event of differentiation and relative otherness which allows and “carries out” 
(austragen) the relative identity and stability of things.35 As Heidegger 
emphasizes in his 1949 foreword to “On the Essence of Ground,” while the 
ontological difference and the nothing are not mutually “equivalent” (einerlei), 
they nevertheless belong together as the self-same issue (das Selbe) for 
thinking—as Being.36 
In the 1929 essay “On the Essence of Reason,” Heidegger presents a 
threefold articulation of Being as the ground of beings. It is evident that this 
articulation is intimately connected to the analysis of the temporality of Dasein 
in Being and Time, as well as to the analyses of significance and world. The 
point of departure is here the transcendence of Dasein. Dasein is itself 
precisely in transcending its immediate present.37 This transcendence is also 
called “freedom,” for in “overcoming” the immediately given toward its 
transcendental context, Dasein is also “free” from the given.38 However, 
freedom is not the arbitrary absence of grounds. On the contrary, freedom as 
transcendence is the original relationship to Being as the back-ground of 
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beings. “All the same, freedom as transcendence is not just a particular ‘kind’ 
of ground; it is the origin of ground in general. Freedom is freedom to ground.”39  
It is precisely through its freedom that Dasein is able to encounter a 
meaningful reality where given beings are placed into a meaningful context, 
into a background, and thus “grounded” or “founded” (gründen) in Being. 
Freedom “gives” and “takes” ground. This event of grounding has three aspects:  
1. Transcendent freedom “establishes” (stiften) or “projects” (entwerfen) 
background in the sense of a “for-the-sake-of-what” (Umwillen)—a 
purpose or end which bestows a sense of purposefulness to the being 
at hand. For example, when a hammer is given to us in the primary 
mode of handiness (Zuhandenheit), we immediately transcend the 
hammer as a material object towards a futural dimension of purpose, a 
“for-which” or an “in-order-to.” The context of purpose, such as 
hammering a nail, building a house, having a place to dwell etc., makes 
the object meaningful to us in a practical context.40 
2. Transcendent freedom “takes ground” (bodennehmen) in its factical and 
historical background, in the situation in which it already finds itself 
entangled (Befindlichkeit). In other words, Dasein is always already 
“taken in” (eingenommen) by its factical circumstances. In projecting its 
goals, Dasein is itself already “thrown” or “ejected” (geworfen) into a 
certain factical situation which delimits in beforehand its possible goals 
in imposing on Dasein a given preliminary articulation and 
interpretation of reality. Because of the facticity, of the “already-going-
 14 
on” character (Gewesenheit) of Dasein, some possibilities are always 
already withdrawn (entzogen) from it. This limitation of proper 
possibilities constitutes the essential finitude of Dasein’s freedom.41 
3. In their initial unity, these two dimensions of temporal transcendence 
allow an intentional relationship to the present as meaningful and well-
founded. Transcendence thus “justifies” (begründen) the present. It 
makes it possible in the first place to seek reasons in asking the 
question “why” or “how come”: how come precisely this and not 
something else?42  
This threefold division is the original essence of ground. The essence of 
ground is thus the temporality of Dasein: the temporal unity of open futural 
possibilities and the factical, already-given historical background which, in 
their mutual interaction, allow the constitution of a meaningful present. Hence 
Heidegger’s compact and challenging summary: 
 
The essence of ground is the transcendentally off-springing threefold 
scattering of grounding into projection of world, having-been-taken-in 
among beings and ontological justification of beings.43  
  
The temporal freedom of transcendent Dasein is thus the origin of the principle 
of ground or reason that has haunted Western philosophy ever since Plato and 
Aristotle. “Freedom is the ground of ground. . . . However, as this ground 
freedom is the void [Ab-grund] of Dasein.”44 And as Heidegger puts it in the late 
1930s, “As void [Ab-grund], Being ‘is’ at once the nothing [das Nichts] as well as 
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the ground.”45 Being is the “void” (Ab-grund), the absent foundation, the back-
ground which itself withdraws and only thus allows beings to occupy the 
foreground. In other words, Being is the relative absentiality which allows 
meaningful presence – “presence-by-absence” or “pres-ab-sence,” as Thomas 
Sheehan famously puts it.46 
It must be noted, however, that whereas this formulation of the essence of 
ground in terms of the transcendence and the freedom of Dasein clearly 
indicates the fundamental orientation of Heidegger’s thought, it is far from 
being his final word on the matter. From the 1930s onwards he subjected the 
entire concept of “transcendence” to an immanent critique as potentially 
misleading and metaphysically determined.47 First of all, it could be taken as a 
subjectively free, ground-constituting activity of Dasein as subjectivity, whereas 
in the end Heidegger wants to show that it is the background itself that “gives 
beingness,” lets presence take place in the receptive open place, in the Da, of 
Dasein. Secondly, the concept of transcendence seems to imply that there is at 
first some immanent self that is then transcended, whereas Heidegger’s point is 
precisely that the “self” of Dasein, which forms the place in which the taking-
place (Ereignis) of presence is possible, is generated through its prior “already 
being beyond itself.” In his 1955–56 lectures on The Principle of Reason 
Heidegger therefore attempts to reformulate his radicalization of the question of 
ground using entirely different expressions. Here he also notes that in 1929 he 
did not listen attentively enough to the wording of Leibniz’s principle.48 To say 
that nothing is without reason or ground is assuredly a metaphysical 
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statement, but if instead we emphasize the word nothing (nihil), we get: nothing 
is without ground. Being as the no-thing-ness is the ground, more precisely, the 
absent ground, which itself has no ground.  
In the end, Leibniz’s grand principle, “Nothing is without reason,” has 
thus been reinterpreted to say, in a free formulation, “No being can be 
meaningfully present in the foreground of being-ness without the temporal 
event of Being that forms its relatively absent, differing, and withdrawing 
background.” There is something rather than nothing precisely because no-
thing-ness forms the background that lets presence as such occupy the 
foreground. Heidegger emphasizes that this background of presence is an 
Abgrund, a void, a bottom-less-ness, an absence or lack of foundation—but 
only from the point of view of traditional metaphysics.49 Considered in a 
positive manner, the Abgrund is not a “privation”—it is simply not the kind of 
positive foundation that metaphysics has been looking for. The ultimate 
foundation of reality and meaning in difference or absentiality does not imply 
the ultimate nihilistic collapse of all meaningfulness and rationality into 
nothingness—a superficial accusation that is often brought up against the 
thought of Derrida, in particular. The differential and absential character of the 
foundation only means that what rationality as such is based on is not itself 
rational, not a positive ratio.  
By now, we have perhaps gained an initial understanding of the 
Heideggerian radicalization of the principle of reason or ground, and we begin 
to see its implications. Heidegger ends his 1929 meditation on the essence of 
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ground by arguing that the great shortcoming in Aristotle’s profound analysis 
of the four kinds of reason is its lack of unity.50 Aristotle is content with 
claiming that it is “evident” that there are exactly these four kinds, without 
really explaining why this is so and what constitutes the unity of the four.51 
Heidegger is, in fact, indirectly proposing that he himself has found this lacking 
unity and common ground in his present analysis of the threefold temporal 
structure of groundedness.  
Starting from the fragments for Contributions to Philosophy (From 
Enowning) in the late 1930s, Heidegger increasingly refers to the unity of four 
dimensions of sense which he names “gods” (die Götter) or the “divine ones” 
(die Göttlichen), “human beings” (die Menschen) or “mortals” (die Sterblichen), 
“world” (die Welt) or “heaven” (der Himmel), and “earth” (die Erde). In his 
famous essay on “The Thing” (1950), Heidegger rather opaquely describes how 
these four dimensions are to be found in unity, as a “unity of four” or “fourfold” 
(Geviert), within a simple thing, a Greek pitcher; pouring wine from the pitcher 
supposedly refers back to the gods, the mortals, heaven, and earth.52 In a 
recent work, the French Heidegger scholar Jean-François Mattéi has argued 
that this baffling account is to be understood precisely as a reinterpretation 
and reworking of the four Aristotelian grounds.53 Fully in agreement with 
Mattéi’s insight, I will try to elaborate this suggestion by trying to show in what 
sense it could be true, and to develop it further by suggesting the fourfold to be 
a rethought version of the threefold division of Dasein’s transcendence to 
grounds in “On the Essence of Ground.”54 
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In Heidegger’s later work, “gods” name the futural sense-bestowing 
dimension of ultimate goals, aims and purposes—we are tempted to say 
“values,” although Heidegger despises this modern subjectivist concept—in 
short, the Aristotelian “final cause.” The “divine ones” are what is most high 
and holy for a given historical world; the “eschatologically” final, ultimate and 
unattainable character of this divine dimension is further emphasized by the 
highly demanding discussion of the “ultimate God” (der letzte Gott) in the sixth 
part or “joining” (Fuge) of the Contributions to Philosophy. “Mortals” are the 
historical and finite community of human beings as receivers, interpreters, and 
re-shapers of meaningfulness—the Aristotelian “efficient cause”—whose 
activities always remain determined by what is beyond human action, by the 
divine. These are the two temporal dimensions of transcendence—the historical 
and social background and the future realm of possible meaningful ends—
whose dynamic mutual conflict (Kampf) creates the context where presence can 
take place. 
Presence is itself a two-dimensional event of internal conflict, consisting of 
the basic dimensions of “earth” and “world.” “Earth” names the opaque 
dimension of inchoate and implicit potentiality-to-be, the solid ground for the 
material and sensuous presence of things in their particularity—the 
Aristotelian “material cause.” “World” or “heaven” is the dimension of light and 
visibility, of significant, discursive articulation which grants relative 
permanence and generality to particular things—the Aristotelian “formal 
cause.” The dispute or discord (Streit) between world and earth, which itself 
 19 
always takes place in the historical situation shaped by the ongoing conflict 
between men and gods, between history and future, forms the dynamic bipolar 
event of the meaningful articulation of concrete reality and of the 
materialization of meaning; for Heidegger, highlighting this event of meaning-
formation constitutes the essence of the work of art.55 As is shown by the 
interesting diagram that we find in section 190 in the fourth joining of the 
Contributions, entitled “Grounding,” the horizontal “transcendent” axis of men 
and gods informs the vertical “immanent” axis of world and earth.56  
 
    world 
    Welt 
    ↑ 
  man        ← E  →       gods    (place) 
  Mensch [Ereignis] Götter  (Da) 
    ↓  
    earth 
    Erde 
 
The intersection of these two mutual oppositions assembles these four 
dimensions into the concrete present reality which forms their “in-between” 
(das Zwischen or Inzwischen)—into the meaningful thing that is grounded in 
the convergence of these dimensions.57 Meaningful presence is precisely the 
“in-between” of these four foundational dimensions. This fourfold 
dimensionality of sense forms the context and background in relation to which 
things become significant for human beings—that is, the fourfold is precisely 
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